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Abstract
What is the problem-solving capacity of artificial intelligence
(AI) for health and medicine? This paper draws out the cognitive sociological context of diagnostic problem-solving for
medical sociology regarding the limits of automation for
decision-based medical tasks. Specifically, it presents a
practical way of evaluating the artificiality of symptoms and
signs in medical encounters, with an emphasis on the visualization of the problem-solving process in doctor-patient
relationships. In doing so, the paper details the logical differences underlying diagnostic task performance between man
and machine problem-solving: its principle of rationality,
the priorities of its means of adaptation to abstraction, and
the effects of seeking optimization in the problem-solving
process. Using these parameters as a heuristic for evaluating the capacity of AI to address issues of diagnostic error
through design, the paper presents a conceptual review of
the discipline of AI in medicine. Studies relying on procedural rationality describe models that treat diagnosis as a
“natural artifact” by employing symbolic methods designed
to simulate human problem-solving. Research adhering
to probabilistic rationality describes models that treat
diagnosis as a “natural artifact” of an ecological image
by utilizing sub-symbolic methods designed to simulate
neural networks. Research guided by situational rationality describes models that require treating diagnosis as a

© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Sociology Compass. 2022;16:e13047.
https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.13047

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/soc4

1 of 17

RAPHAEL

2 of 17

“socio-cognitive artifact,” the artificiality of which is organized in discourses of patient-centered decision-making. The
paper concludes with a commentary on the ethical application of AI in health and medicine, given the logical differences underlying diagnostic task performance.
KEYWORDS

artificial intelligence, artificial intelligibility, cognitive sociology,
human problem-solving, practical ritualistic activity,
quasi-decomposability of complexity, situational rationality

Medicine is not a science. Instead, it is a rational, science-using, inter-level, interpretive activity undertaken for the care of a sick person. As an interpretive activity turned toward an endless succession
of individuals, it takes the patient as its text and seeks to understand his or her malady in the light of
current biological, epidemiological, and psychological knowledge.
Montgomery Hunter (1991, p. 25)

1 | INTRODUCTION
Medical encounters are the crux of the diagnostic problem-solving process. Sociology has long understood this
process by critically examining how medical discourse shapes the relation of mind and body through medical knowledge, the medical profession, and the deployment of medical expertise (Foucault, 1973; Freidson, 1970; Patel
et al., 2012; Prior, 2003; Rose, 2007; Turner & Samson, 1995). However, with the study of artificial intelligence
(AI) in health and medicine, these conceptual frameworks are insufficient to capture the ethical issues necessarily
surrounding medical authority and diagnostic error. In the context of understanding the limits of AI as a function of
human discourse, the missing heuristic I propose emphasizes artificiality and its effects on the organization of the
problem-solving process. The point is to provide sociologists with a practical guide to the technicalities of the literature on engineering AI in health and medicine, thereby enabling them to sort, select, and use the relevant literature
to guide their own research. The definition of this heuristic will draw from the perspective of cognitive sociology
(Raphael., 2017, 2021) to clarify what the AI actually does and does not do in the course of problem-solving. This is in
contrast with the different senses in which AI is understood (e.g., Liu, 2021).
This review analyzes artificiality by evaluating diagnostic task performance in medical encounters according to
three heuristic criteria: the principle of rationality, the prioritization of design or discourse in its means of adaptation,
and the effect of its capacity for optimization in human and machine problem-solving. The principle of rationality
posits a model of intelligence as a means of adaptation to a problem and arriving at a solution. These means reveal
how priorities of design or discourse estimate information from medical encounters. The priority of design treats
health and medicine as “natural artifacts.” In that case, the capacity of human intervention is conditional upon and
constrained by natural law, and the heuristic assumption is that “essence precedes existence.” The priority of discourse
indicates that health and medicine are “socio-cognitive artifacts.” In this case, the scope of human intervention in
nature is secondary to the capacity of human participation to interfere with designable solutions. Here, the heuristic
assumption is that “existence precedes essence.” By distinguishing between “natural artifacts” and “socio-cognitive
artifacts,” we are acknowledging that a deconstructed truth does not necessarily provide a solution to biomedical
problems (Clarke, 2010; Kerr, 2004), that is, until we understand whether or not the optimization capacity of human
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and machine involves the imaginative potential of situational rationality. In that case, the lack of certainty may be at
least as much a resource as an obstacle, and its status as a resource is what is crucial in evaluating clinical judgment.
These criterial heuristics will help us grasp the degree to which clinical judgment focuses the problem-solving
process in a way that acknowledges three basic facts related to the doctor-patient relationship. First, the case does
not merely pose a technical problem, be it of organizational, occupational, professional, ideological, or profitable
concern. Second, the subject of the case is embodied as a patient who has to live with the consequences of a diagnosis. Third, a patient is a participant in their own case, a participant who has to reconcile their own narrative (with, e.g.,
attempts to offer alternative accounts of potential causes) with necessities of treatment, its efficacy as a solution,
and the contingencies involved in continuing treatment past the point of ostensible solution. These facts point to
the cognitive sociological context of how human problem-solving contributes to medical encounters and locate the
prospects of AI relative to that context. The remainder of this article presents the major concepts that support this
claim. It begins by locating the idea of “artificiality” in its cognitive sociological context in order to show how the
different priorities of design and discourse configure the problem-solving process and its application to diagnosis in
medical encounters. Next, the AI literature in health and medicine will be reviewed according to three principles of
rationality that allow us to distinguish the problem-solving capacity of the human from that of a machine. Research
informed by procedural rationality reveals how the priority of design guides the development of knowledge-based
and case-based expert systems for supporting clinical decision-making. Research adhering to probabilistic rationality reveals how the priority of design guides the development of machine learning algorithms for modeling clinical
decision-making. Research based on situational rationality reveals how the priority of discourse guides the contribution of human-computer interaction to diagnosis within the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, a broader notion of
artificial intelligibility will be described as presenting an ethical issue for applying AI in health and medicine.
In selecting the work to be reviewed, I began with the journal Artificial Intelligence in Medicine to identify relevant
review articles. Then, I used Google Scholar to identify cross-references and subsequent studies. In this respect, the
paper offers a conceptual overview of the problem-solving necessary for medical encounters to evaluate the extent
to which AI can contribute to medical encounters. For a comprehensive survey of technical implementations of AI, see
a review of 185 methods (Pandey & Mishra, 2009); for the scope of more recent applications within the medical
domain, see two recent surveys of intelligence-based medicine (Chang, 2020; Topol, 2019b). For a historical overview
of the debates within the field of AI, see a review of the controversy between symbolic and sub-symbolic information
processing (Cardon et al., 2018; Mitchell, 2019).

2 | THE ARTIFICIALITY OF HEALTH AND MEDICINE AND MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS
Sociological studies of science and technology describe artificiality as “the results of work by scientists and engineers” in integrating “human and nonhuman actors in analyses of the construction of knowledge and things” (Cf.
Krippendorff, 2007; Sismondo, 2008). However, for medical sociology and its relationship to AI and problem-solving,
we require a more archaic meaning and explanation: a state of affairs that provides “evidence of human artifice,” as
Herbert Simon described it in The Sciences of the Artificial ([1968]1996). Simon distinguishes artificial things from
natural things. Artificial things (a) are synthesized by human beings, (b) imitate appearances in natural things while
lacking the reality of natural things, (c) specify functions, goals, and adaptation that characterize them, and (d) their
design is discussed in descriptive and imperative terms. It is in regard to these characteristics that Simon characterizes “artificiality” as connoting “perceptual similarity but essential difference, resemblance from without rather
than within.” (Simon, [1968]1996, p. 13) The philosophical challenge is that “those things we call artifacts are not
apart from nature,” that “a forest may be a phenomenon of nature; a farm certainly is not.” In this sense, health,
disease, illness, and sickness are irrefutably artificial in light of how human organization, as the distribution of conditions and constraints that shape the social environment and its resources, intervenes with natural life expectancies.
The challenge for diagnosis is to sort out the configuration of artificiality by “the visualization of symptoms and
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signs as forming a clinical picture of some pathological process” (Houghton et al., 2010). This section will describe
how problem-solving processes differentially prioritize design and discourse and their impact on this process of
visualization.
Studies of problem-solving reveal two basic models of how natural artifacts prioritize design in explaining how
the “adaptation of means to environments is brought about.” Design is undertaken within an information processing system to arrive at a solution that aligns human ends and natural means. 1 This alignment is achieved either
through simplification or through complication in the problem-solving process. The design of simplification utilizes
procedural rationality to hierarchically, iteratively, and recursively identify nontrivial redundancies that structure a maze; the structure of this maze enables the removal of ambiguity and the selection of criteria for halting
search. That is, it defines a procedure for verifying that “the end of the maze” has been reached (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1981, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). The design of complication utilizes probabilistic rationality to
iteratively and recursively simulate mathematically tractable possibilities that provide a “shape to the mold.” This
shape is provided as an ecological image in which a branching tree of achievable situations is defined either by a
well-structured domain (e.g., rules of a game), or a classification of examples and non-examples, that is, to refine
hypotheses about the fit of multi-level representations to external data (Gibson, 1977; Turner, 2018). Accordingly,
adaptation by the problem-solver is a response to the complexity of the system or to the complexity of the environment: a response in which the degree of selectivity is a property of the design for which the scope of an intervention
is primarily constrained by natural laws. In this respect, human problem-solving favors procedural rationality due to
the constraints of bounded rationality, the fact that attention is a scarce resource in which the size of memory and
processing capacity are inextricably linked (Simon, [1947]1997, p. 129). Machine problem-solving, contrastingly, is
only constrained by the scalability of resources in which the efficacy of iterative and recursive processing is a function
of software and hardware (Nagarajan & Stevens, 2008).
Studies emphasizing the priority of discourse reveal the constitution of socio-cognitive artifacts through
“processes of reification” in arriving at a solution in which human participation interferes with our own human interventions with nature (Raphael, 2017). By “discourse,” we refer to “doing and speaking” in the sense of “collective
enunciation,” that “to participate in discourse is to be caught up in a certain momentum that is independent of
individually specific motives or intentions.” 2 Processes of reification have aspects that are functionally ineradicable
and aspects that are invariably in motion. The functionally ineradicable aspects refer to the fact that the arrival at a
solution requires a momentary representation of the problem—to be treated as a thing—in which the truncation of
the representation of our experience is unavoidable. The aspect that is not unavoidable is the degree to which the
semblance of an artifact presents a “predicament of intelligibility,” thereby presenting an invitation to participate in
the problem-solving process through “practical ritualistic activity” (Goffman, 1967, 1974; Raphael, 2013). 3 The functionally ineradicable aspect relies on a principle of reification to guide the selectivity of its processes; the invariably in
motion aspects constitute the complexity of the situation: “inferential functions” that describe the cognitive relation
between the “degree of relatedness” and the “degree of decomposability” in discourse (an “inferential function” is
what is accomplished by the impression of a set of expressions). In other words, processes of reification seek to
explain the situational rationality of whatever is “retrieved and held up for inspection,” instead of resorting to a natural belief or a natural artifact. 4 Thus, the priority of discourse reveals the immanence of information itself within the
problem-solving process. This implies that reference, representation, and computation in the problem-solving process
are not topically given to perception; the relatedness and decomposability of its “quasi-essence” is thoroughly situational. This is consequential for problem-solving since a proper grasp of the imaginative aspect of the representation
in the situation indicates the degree to which participation allows for engrossment, and the degree to which engrossment realizes the balance of inferential functions appropriate to the object, its transformation, and the motion of
its rhetorical effect. In sum, the complexity of discourse highlights how the distinctions between “situation,” “occasion,” and “context” refer to a non-recursive ambiguity that accounts for the social aspects of explaining information
processing—without treating the social as the accidental or elective presence of other individuals or as an aggregation
of individual cognitions (e.g., Dazeley et al., 2021). Crucially, then, socio-cognitive artifacts explain how participants
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may succeed in utilizing the same principle of reification while they may nevertheless fail to participate appropriately
in practical ritualistic activity.
For medical encounters, the two different priorities in arriving at solutions determine whether or not the visualization process of the clinical picture is dependent on the doctor-patient relationship. If the case is a natural artifact, then a
diagnosis is merely a technical problem. The accreditation of selectivity, the source of complexity, and the authority of
the solution are external to the problem-solving process in that the design of diagnostic possibilities is determined in
advance by standardized single disease management guidelines that provide step-by-step instructions about the most
intimate details of medical care (Collins, 2017; Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Timmermans & Angell, 2001). If the case is a
socio-cognitive artifact, then a diagnosis is not merely a technical problem. The accreditation of selectivity, the source
of complexity, and the authority of the solution are derived from the situational rationality of the doctor-patient relationship. Crucially, since this artificiality does not primarily prioritize human intervention in nature, it must be noted
here that the concern is with how human participation generates symptoms and signs that obscure technical problems.
For example, Mishler (1984) observed that physicians and patients often pursue distinctly, and sometimes conflicting,
agendas in a medical visit, leading physicians recurrently to suppress the patients' concerns, even though they can be
important sources of evidence of further medical problems. Similarly, Waitzkin (1991) reports that denying the expression of personal troubles reinforces the patient's accommodation to the social contexts in which illness arises. This
clinical picture becomes particularly important when mental symptoms are the subjects of scrutiny. As Goffman (1969)
explains, mental symptoms are typically disruptions in social relationships and organizations. These disruptions are
experienced through socio-cognitive artifacts of place in which alienation, rebellion, insolence, untrustworthiness,
hostility, apathy, and intrusiveness are expressed as indications of pathological identity. Processes of reification thus
reveal the depths to which discourse reaches into our situational sense of sanity; without the confirming or disconfirming the reality of social status relative to the expectations and obligations found in public places, workplaces, and
the family, whether analog or digital, we would have no frame of reference to draw from as the basis for participation.
Thus, the diagnostic problem-solving involved in medical encounters is oriented toward building a clinical
picture based on two incommensurate tasks: assessing the intervention required for the body and assessing the
extent to which human participation interferes with the focus on the body. For the first task, symptoms and signs
are natural artifacts of a biomedical framework: the case and its medical history is independent of the patient in
which highly detailed information about the patient's past and present medical conditions, past diagnoses, disease
progressions, treatments, lab test results, and the like are reliably retrievable such that any technical problems are
algorithmically discernible as properties in need of treatment through some procedural intervention (e.g., pharmaceutical, surgical, chronic monitoring). For the second task, the existence of symptoms and signs precedes their
essence as socio-cognitive artifacts: the constitution of the case is dependent on the doctor-patient relationship in
which a documented medical history serves as an indication for memory and not a substitute for the narrative of
the patient's embodied experience. In this sense, symptoms and signs have an ambiguous character in which the
discourse among the doctor and the patient have to participate appropriately in practical ritualistic activity such that
the deferred meaning of doing and speaking is reconciled with what has been done and said, especially in the accreditation of selectivity. In other words, clinical questions are not formulated by treating the patient as a demographic
profile; the information the patient seeks to provide—and the information the doctor seeks—mutually acknowledges
the experiential consequentiality of the patient's condition and the difficulties the patient faces in coming to terms
with the information the doctor provides. That is, an acknowledgment that continuing treatment past the point of
solution is not merely a commitment to procedural rationality. It requires explaining how procedural rationality is
reconcilable with the situational rationality that the patient continually experiences, especially in the case of chronic
conditions where outpatient treatments face many contingencies in being properly administered by less-skilled practitioners (e.g., family, home-health aides). Because of this, the task cannot be adequately designed in advance, nor
can its performance be subjected to selective trial-and-error or full simulation. The discourse of this visualization
process is thoroughly a non-recursive conversation in which discerning treatment requires handling the complexities
of discourse and the motion of its rhetorical effects.
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3 | THE SITUATED RATIONALITY OF DIAGNOSIS: TASK PERFORMANCE AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The previous section highlighted how diagnostic problem-solving involves a visualization composed of two incommensurate tasks: one prioritizing design and one prioritizing discourse. The first task takes the body as its focus:
the burden of the problem-solving process on the physician's own bounded rationality can be reduced considerably through design while improving their problem-solving performance in visualizing symptoms and signs. The
second task focuses on the situation: the burden of the problem-solving process must be shared with the patient so
that the visualization of symptoms and signs relates the scope of reference to its degree of specialization in specifying
its realm of meaning. The following sub-sections examine how the performance of each of these tasks is described in
the literature regarding three principles of rationality: procedural, probabilistic, and situational. Elaborating on these
principles will help us distinguish the problem-solving capacity of a human from that of a machine to understand (and
evaluate) the relationship between AI and medical ethics.

3.1 | Procedural rationality and the symbolic visualization of bodily diagnosis
The principle of procedural rationality is that the structure of the maze and its simplification determines whether or
not the design of a natural artifact is optimizable. If the size and scope of the maze are consistent with a well-defined
logic of representation, then an algorithm can be designed to approach and then reach the end of the maze. An
algorithm is a temporally ordered set of actions taken by design to anticipate success, that is, to arrive at an optimal
solution, for example, the maximization of utility. This assumes that each discrete step can be evaluated in advance
with enough foresight to validate their contribution to achieving an optimal solution. If the logic of representation is
ill-defined, then the hierarchically guided elimination of ambiguity will progress until the size and scope of the maze
are fully determined. If the size and scope of the problem representation exceed computational capacity, then a
heuristic is designed. A heuristic is a set of actions taken, prescribed as “rules of thumb,” toward a satisfactory solution
by enabling a degree of selectivity otherwise inadequate to the task. Rather than systemically searching through the
maze, rules of thumb are utilized to derive a criterion for halting search when a satisfactory solution is found. This
criterion is iteratively and recursively derived by decomposing the maze through a succession of means-ends analyses (trial and error) so that solving smaller problems will lead to solving the larger problem.
The essential assumption of these goal-seeking instructions is that the difference between these computational
forms lies in the degree to which the solvability of the problem is given by the “symbolic” character of a domain
or concept. This implies that computation merely involves “storing symbols, and inputting, outputting, organizing
and reorganizing such symbols and symbol structures, comparing them for identity or difference, and acting conditionally on the outcomes of the tests of identity” (Newell & Simon, 1956). The simplifying priority of design for the
use of algorithms implies that achieving an ideal solution is possible with enough engineering foresight (Chandel &
Sood, 2014). The simplifying priority of design for the use of heuristics implies that achieving foresight regarding
all possible alternatives is too costly, and is not merely a matter of engineering. It thereby requires us to “satisfice”
instead by aiming “at the good when the best is incalculable” (Simon, 1956, 1979). In other words, the efficacy of
algorithms depends on how the maze is systematically searched, whereas the efficacy of heuristics expresses the
integration of information and skill in order to forgo an extensive systematic search.
The significance of this symbolic character lies in its prospect of encompassing an entire domain of goal-seeking
instructions, referred to as an “expert system.” The programming of expert systems identifies the problems appropriate to the domain. It gradually develops a body of strategies as more is learned about the domain in which larger sets
of inference rules are necessary to maintain the logical coherence of the symbolic information processing system. In
this respect, since the design of algorithms anticipates a successful systematic search, procedural rationality tends
to fail when facing large domains. It was only through the addition of heuristic evaluation functions that enabled
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expert systems to develop enough to construct and resolve logical inconsistencies. The medical encounter equivalent is the development of clinical support systems that provide computer-assisted diagnoses (Miller et al., 1982).
These systems help doctors cope with the overwhelming amount of data and knowledge produced by medical technology (Cristiani et al., 2019; Huang et al., 1993). These systems tend to symbolize natural artifacts in two ways:
knowledge-based and case-based.
Knowledge-based expert systems separate parts from the whole by storing information about the domain separately from information about classification that brings a whole together. For diagnosis, the system stores individual disease profiles that list findings that can occur in patients with each illness. This enables a computer program
to utilize heuristic principles to select a hierarchical classification principle to produce an exhaustive differential
diagnosis for each finding. Extensive studies have led to the development of computer programs to act as quick
medical references, like a simple electronic textbook customized by the user to generate hypotheses (Lucas, 2001;
Miller, 2009). From an intelligence perspective, these systems offer nothing like a visualization of the patient within
the discourse of the medical encounter. Its rules merely allow doctors to improve their own decision-making by mediating the difference between acknowledging the validity of the list of profiles (possible cases) and converting data into
situationally rationalized information, data that is generated to a significant extent through discourse.
Case-based expert systems construct wholes by identifying similarities and differences by recalling and reusing
specific knowledge obtained from records of past experience. This enables the system to handle unexpected cases by
imposing otherwise missing input values based on formal inference from previously indexed wholes (profiles). These
wholes are accessed by a user through a series of question prompts that updates the lists of similar relevant stored
cases and suitable questions through “dialogue inferences” (Ekerholt et al., 2014, pp. 51–55). For diagnosis, this adds
an additional interactive component to a customized electronic textbook by highlighting matching features between
the target case and the problem description (Hillig & Müller, 2020). From an intelligence perspective, while these
systems provide an alternative interface for establishing relevance in the search process, there is still no visualization
of the patient, and this is necessary if the exceptional case is to be recognized medically in its possible (and probable)
exceptionality.
These two different implementations of procedural rationality noticeably stress the doctor's need to cope with
bounded rationality, external limitations, given the conservative estimate that about 12 million significant misdiagnoses occur per year in the United States (Singh et al., 2014). These diagnostic errors often arise from how humans
deal with natural artifacts (e.g., failing to order the right test, misinterpreting a test that was performed, failing to
consider a proper differential diagnosis, or missing an abnormal finding). At the same time, while clinical support
systems can build in redundancies to reduce these sorts of errors, these systems are nevertheless limited in their
capacity to simulate the aspects of human problem-solving that contribute to successful task performance, namely
how heuristics computationally operate heuristically in a situation, and not as a formalized algorithmic evaluation
function. In other words, the greatest strength of expert systems—to make rule-based inferences toward a goal—is
also its greatest weakness since the crux of rule-following in problem-solving is knowing when rules must be broken,
and the visualization of that possibility requires intelligibility, and not mere intelligence. For diagnosis, this means that
the visualization of the body must not merely be an algorithmic model of the patient's case, but a dynamic image of
the body as a natural artifact.

3.2 | Probabilistic rationality and the sub-symbolic visualization of bodily diagnosis
The principle of probabilistic rationality is that the complication of an ecological image enables the optimization of a
natural artifact's design. This implies that the alignment of human ends with natural means requires fitting the case
to the environment rather than to a domain-defined maze. Search methods instead optimize the probabilities in
the data, probabilities that cannot be programmed by a symbolic logic of representation. Algorithms instead model
networks of neurons where the strength and weakness of connections between neurons depend on the weight given
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to the inputs calculated in its sum. Crucially, these networks allow for the parallel processing of information in which
neurons that are wired together, fire together. This computational mode complicates the problem-solving process by
“sub-symbolically” encoding the problem in a mathematically tractable manner. In this sense, the solvability of a problem is a function of the training of the network and its methods of machine learning. A basic artificial neural network
begins its training with randomized weights and connections, which are gradually organized into layers. Such a layer
is modeled as a column of units—with each unit representing a neuron. Layers are divided between hidden layers and
an output layer. Hidden layers contain non-output units that connect the inputs with the output layer. Optimization
thus describes how a model learns the activation values of the neurons as a natural artifact of “the parameters in the
objective function from the given data” (Sun et al., 2020).
Machine learning optimizes the probabilities in the model by training on examples to determine the weights and
thresholds that would produce correct answers. This self-organizing training occurs in one of three ways: supervised
learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning trains the network by beginning
with a data structure defined by a programmer who defines a set of desired outcomes for a range of inputs. Through
continual feedback, hypotheses about the relevant features are tested to fine-tune its classification of examples
and non-examples. Unsupervised learning trains the network by beginning with a data structure that has no desired
outcomes. Instead, co-occurring features are found to produce patterns or clusters in the data; it mines for patterns
to create its own classification of examples and non-examples. In short, these two methods utilize feedback to
create a path with no conception of the maze; it merely identifies a well-refined prediction. Reinforcement learning,
in contrast, utilizes feedback to refine decision-making through reward or punishment, represented by a non-binary
evaluation function as a positive or negative score. The evaluation function does not need to remember previous
states; it only needs to learn values that are good predictions for rewards. Reinforcement learning thus creates a way
to navigate the maze with no conception of the maze or its paths (Silver et al., 2021). The efficacy of these training
methods comes from their integration into multilayered neural networks where the multiple hidden layers allow for
deep learning, a method of encoding the results as multi-level representations (Koteluk et al., 2021).
The significance of this sub-symbolic character lies in its capacity to forgo the weaknesses of expert systems.
Whereas expert systems allow for patterns to be recognized through crafted inference rules, machine learning develops its own evaluation function, enabling the development of natural language processing (speech recognition) and
computer vision (image recognition) without the prescribed limitations imposed by the serial processing of rules. The
medical encounter equivalent to this is the use of medical imaging and electronic health records (EHR) as natural artifacts. The use of medical imaging visualizes the body in a way that is imperceptible to the naked eye. In this respect,
four datasets are generated: magnetic resonance images, computerized tomography scans, X-ray images, and ultrasound images. Each of these images provides different diagnostic information. Accordingly, a classifier needs to be
trained for each purpose, typically by differentiating between anatomical template images and histopathology images
within each dataset—to encode a multi-level representation that recognizes how the arrangement of pixels in one
set of images indicates a visualized natural artifact of the body in a healthy condition and a body in a diseased condition. Additionally, at a minimum, this diagnostic modeling needs to account for scanner variability, scan acquisition
settings, subject demography, and heterogeneity in disease characteristics across subjects—all of which affect the
design of the natural artifact (Barragán-Montero et al., 2021). The use of EHR systems visualizes the body as data.
In this respect, these data serve two functions that guide their basic design: diagnostic support and organizational
communication. The diagnostic support function requires storing and maintaining patient demographics, medication lists, allergies, diagnoses, test results, clinical assessments, and treatments as well-defined data structures
that include longitudinal data and hierarchically organized information. The organizational communication function
supports the diagnostic and treatment process by streamlining the management and coordination of orders, results,
and case reporting. When these natural artifacts are built into a dataset for machine learning, the scale numbers in
hundreds of billions of data points. The primary challenge in building these datasets is that the natural artifacts of the
organizational communication function are often structured in non-standardized machine-readable formats across
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institutional lines, although attempts are being made through the development of the openEHR clinical modeling
program (Fernandes et al., 2020; Wulffet al., 2018).
From an intelligence perspective, while the visualization of the patient's symptoms and signs are static in medical imaging and dynamic in EHRs, the application of probabilistic rationality through machine learning diagnostic
algorithms remains largely untested as part of a clinician's regular course of work (Rajkomar et al., 2019). For medical
imaging analysis, when the task is to retrospectively identify abnormalities across a variety of image types, these algorithms perform well. For the analysis of EHRs, when the task is to retrospectively predict overall patient outcomes,
the treatment of sepsis, and cancer therapy, these algorithms performed well (Lin et al., 2021). However, for the goal
of precision medicine, to fit data analytics to a single patient rather than a population, many machine learning studies continue to be limited to a single data modality, meaning that such algorithms are still at the early development
stage (MacEachern & Forkert, 2021). In other words, sub-symbolic methods of diagnosis are substantive areas of
research that remain under-utilized in prospective real-world settings. They are under-utilized because dataset size
is not everything. While datasets are slowly getting larger (including more incomplete and noisy data), predictive
performance is not improving at the same rate. In overcoming the rules of procedural rationality, with their limitations
acting as a source of error, the socio-cognitive context of probabilistic rationality and its weaknesses are slowly being
revealed: systemic human biases or errors in producing data are being reinforced by the natural artifact's design
(Kudina & Boer, 2021). This socio-cognitive context implies that the ability of these machine learning algorithms to
attach meaning to detected patterns remains limited to its scope of probabilistic rationality. For example, the diagnoses from which the models are built may be provisional or incorrect, in which conditions that do not manifest recordable symptoms are outside the scope of the data. Accordingly, these models should be restricted from autonomous
diagnosis-making and relegated to helping doctors cope with the limits of their own bounded rationality.

3.3 | Situational rationality and the visualization of diagnosis in human-computer
interaction
The principle of situational rationality is that the demands of discourse—without and within practical ritualistic
activity—generate the configuration of artificiality and complexity in the problem-solving process as socio-cognitive
artifacts of how human participation responds to predicaments of intelligibility. This implies that the means of adaptation for human interventions with nature cannot achieve optimization by merely prioritizing design over discourse
since human participation necessarily involves socially constituted processes of reification. These processes of
reification situate conditions and constraints in which the information processing capacity of participants in the
problem-solving process is a function of the distribution of resources and the constitution of bounded rationality. In
other words, the socio-cognitive context of the problem-solving process—the immanence of information (its degrees
of selectivity, decomposability, and relatedness) and the authority of the solution—interferes with the scaling of information processing systems to the level of human organization precisely because the priority of design cannot solve
the demands of discourse in advance. Accordingly, principles of reification are situationally selected to momentarily
address the deferral of meaning (uncertainty), ambiguity, and the imaginative potential of continuing past the point
of immediate solution. Thus, search methods are not merely a function of a computation in which iterative recursion
simplifies or complicates a logic of representation—either through procedural or probabilistic rationality. Instead,
for human problem-solving, search methods have to make intelligible the symbolic serial and sub-symbolic parallel
processing of discourse by balancing and reconciling situationally appropriate principles of reification. Accordingly,
the correspondence between reference, representation, and computation cannot be given in advance; its ratio can
only be estimated as a momentary belief about the size and scope of the problem and its solvability.
Momentary beliefs describe how socio-cognitive artifacts acquire their “quasi-essence” through discourse and
the motions of its rhetorical effects. In this sense, the existence of domains and concepts are dependent on participation in practical ritualistic activity: the manner in which they are “retrieved and held up for inspection” affects how
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they are socio-cognitively perceived, constituted in memory, and made meaningful for estimating the demands of a
solution and its implementation. The literature reveals that this situational rationality is consequential for design in
two respects. First, design must communicate the limits of machine problem-solving, that is, how its solutions are
natural artifacts. Second, design must communicate that its lack of capacity for socio-cognitive artifacts implies that
automation itself will not address how communication is itself a significant source of error in decision-making. These
two challenges of discourse for design show the effect of socio-cognitive artifacts in medical encounters through
clinical support systems and the use of patient decision aids in shared decision-making.
Studies of diagnostic human-computer interaction show that the efficacy of machine problem-solving for clinical
support systems is limited by how socio-cognitive artifacts determine the context, quality, and prospective value of
medical information. The contextual character of medical information is a socio-cognitive artifact of medical discourse
that demanded its generation: doctors are aware of the constantly evolving temporal movement of a medical case,
and, to some extent, they allow the case to build itself. However, in order to build a model, design eliminates the
contextual character of medical information in EHRs by decontextualizing the information into data, which is then
modeled in its own context, a context that is wholly dependent on a strictly formal construction that is unlikely to be
compatible with that revealed in the reciprocity of discourse. The design of this natural artifact cannot, on its own,
make the data speak for themselves. As Berg and Goorman (1999) explain, “the further information has to be able to
circulate, the more work is required to disentangle the information from the context of its production,” meaning that
a socio-cognitive artifact will result from the motion of its rhetorical effects when it is placed in discourse to arrive
at a diagnosis. The quality of medical information is a socio-cognitive artifact of how poor clinical evidence is deeply
embedded within published medical research and the treatment guidelines informed by them. Ioannidis et al. (2017)
report that this “medical information mess” poses an obstacle to the effectiveness of clinical support systems for
two reasons. First, few clinical studies, even in the major general medical journals, are able to avoid exaggerating
their results or overestimating treatment effects because of a reliance on methodological designs that have limited
generalizability. Second, among those practitioners who report feeling confident to evaluate the medical literature,
there is often “a lack of the basic skills required for determining a study's reliability and applicability.” For these
reasons, the design of natural artifacts, a machine learning model based on clinical studies, further contributes to
misinformation, even if it relies randomized controlled trials (Ioannidis, 2016). The prospective value of medical information is a socio-cognitive artifact of its explainability and its intelligibility. The explainability of a model for medical
diagnosis is contestable in terms of the data used, its bias, and its accuracy (Ploug & Holm, 2020; Zhang et al., 2021).
The intelligibility of a model relies on how its visual design communicates ambiguity within clinical discourse. This
poses unique challenges for formalized design since the goal of such visualizations are to become “so highly situated,
so fitting, so natural” that they are “unremarkable,” even in the context of purely professional clinical decision making
(Yang et al., 2019, 2020). Yet, such design principles are at odds with what doctors require for “effective human–AI
collaboration” as information about the “basic, global properties of the model” (i.e., its overall design objective, its
known strengths and limitations, and its subjective point-of-view) requires placing the model within a discourse (Cai
et al., 2019). As Marathe and Toyama (2020) report, this quantification and visualization of physiological indicators
are insufficient for expert problem-solving in which the narrow focus of formalized systems on “the individual patient
and their body is not borne out in real-world hospital settings.” Even the diagnosis of epileptic seizures is a deeply
situated process in which design decisions may exclude significant portions of data that may become salient later on,
as the interactive situation changes. Hence, the prospective value of medical information is limited when treated as
a natural artifact without acknowledging situational rationality.
Studies of patient decision aids in shared decision-making reveal that communication remains a significant obstacle in medical encounters when clinicians underestimate patients' desires for information beyond mere data (Scalia
et al., 2019). Instead, for most medical encounters involving primary care, despite intensive efforts at implementation,
current evidence strongly suggests that doctors “simply jettison shared decision-making and patient-centered care”
since intermediate-stakes decisions are “overwhelmingly numerous and lead to real-time limits.” When this communication is attempted, doctors are likely to provide only 1–2 min for such a conversation (Caverly & Hayward, 2020).
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However, as Elwyn (2021) reports, this discourse involves “the cognitive-emotional work of becoming aware of
options, of processing details about the harms and benefits of options, and coming to terms about facets of uncertainty and existential issues.” When contrasted with the time therapists require to assist their patients (often 30-min
weekly sessions), it is clear that many doctors prefer to address patients as merely natural artifacts. In this respect,
recent attempts to integrate EHRs and patient decision aids overemphasize their own utility; by assuming that
providing more “information” improves decision-making, doctors fail to assess the extent to which human participation interferes with emphasis on the body and thereby reinforces the probabilistic rationality of the modeled EHRs
(Coylewright et al., 2020).
From an intelligence perspective, the situational rationality of these studies reveals that task performance for the
visualization of diagnosis within medical encounters is a function of misaligning the priorities of design and discourse.
Design, whether procedural or probabilistic, inevitably fails when its means of adaptation ignores the complexity
and movement of discourse. While expert systems and machine learning algorithms may successfully contribute to
visualizing a patient's case as a natural artifact, both applications of rationality fail to achieve an understanding of
medicinal practice “beyond the conception of patients as mere bundles of diseases” (Bjerring & Busch, 2020). Human
problem-solving succeeds insofar as we acknowledge that natural artifacts, though necessary, are insufficient for
problem-solving. As a function of our bounded rationality, we estimate the socio-cognitive artifacts of our situational
rationality as we adapt to the failures of design to account for the necessary deferral of meaning in discourse (e.g.,
as in implementing vaccination programs and public health guidelines in the context of misinformation). Machine
problem-solving cannot design its way out of this predicament since the priority of our goals is a matter of intelligibility rather than formally-oriented intelligence. For diagnosis, this requires understanding how the meanings of natural
artifacts is deferred in the problem-solving process. This point becomes difficult to ignore when we summarize what
the AI actually does and does not do in the course of diagnostic problem-solving.

4 | THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE CASE AND MEDICAL ETHICS
Technological innovation often chases its own ends unless it avoids the course of creating a design. Accordingly, critics of science and technology are routinely required to raise ethical concerns about the alignment of means and ends
as a corrective to the ambitions and imperatives of engineering. While an ethical outline of epistemic, normative, and
legal concerns is well-documented for AI in medicine (Morley et al., 2020; Peek et al., 2015; Schönberger, 2019), the
focus on inconclusive, inscrutable, or misguided evidence (with its potential for unfair discriminatory outcomes and
liabilities), as it is traditionally discussed, overlooks the cognitive sociological context of the problem-solving process.
This paper has sought to introduce a heuristic for revealing this context: to show how the artificiality and complexity of the problem-solving process are demonstrable according to principles of rationality. To refocus the ethical
debate, these principles reveal differences in models of intelligence that delineate between human and machine
problem-solving, namely the degree to which an operative optimization assumption alters the priorities of design
and discourse, that is, the handling of natural and socio-cognitive artifacts. I have argued that this optimization
assumption poses the central ethical issue in the clinical problem-solving process for the concerns of medical ethics.
By demonstrating how diagnostic problem-solving involves two incommensurate tasks, the literature reviewed in this
paper reveals the sizable impact of this optimization assumption on the relationship between task performance and
principles of rationality.
For procedural rationality, this optimization assumption shapes the “symbolic” character of expert systems in
which the visualization of diagnosis focuses doctor-patient relationships on simplifying natural artifacts. In this
respect, to maximize the utility of a knowledge-based or case-based system, information has to be simplified in order
to adhere to organizationally-determined procedures and guidelines. This encoding enables search methods to structure the diagnosis as a maze in which computation is the only obstacle in the way of arriving at a solution through an
evaluation function crafted by hierarchical iterative recursion.

12 of 17

RAPHAEL

For probabilistic rationality, this optimization assumption shapes the “sub-symbolic” character of machine learning in which the visualization of diagnosis focuses doctor-patient relationships on complicating natural artifacts. In
this respect, to maximize the learning performance of the model by fitting it to its environment, the structure of
information has to be complicated so that it is mathematically tractable. This encoding enables search methods to
train an evaluation function as a multi-level representation without domain-crafted rules. The sub-symbolic character
of this multi-level representation (with its parallel processing) implies that the computation of an evaluation function
is a natural artifact of classifying examples and non-examples in a supervised, unsupervised, or a reinforced iterative
recursion of a refined prediction.
For situational rationality, acknowledging the demands of discourse (with its predicaments of intelligibility)
requires rejecting the optimization assumption as the achievement of an ideal solution since the artificiality and
complexity of discourse cannot be merely encoded as natural artifacts. Instead, the visualization of diagnosis must
focus on doctor-patient relationships in resolving the predicament of intelligibility by assessing the sort of intervention required for the body and assessing the extent to which human participation interferes with the body as
purely natural. Accordingly, in order to determine the meaning of natural artifacts (i.e., how the context, quality,
and prospective value of medical information are placed within discourse), the encoding of socio-cognitive artifacts
must be estimated in terms of how the immanence of information to the decision process and the authority of the
solution constitute momentary beliefs in the problem-solving process about the size and scope of the domain. This
discourse allows for the visualization of symptoms and signs in order to achieve intelligibility through participation
in practical ritualistic activity. Such search methods balance the internal and external conditions and constraints on
the problem-solving process with the constitution of bounded rationality (and its dynamic demands of serial-parallel
processing of non-recursive ambiguity).
Now, if we accept three basic facts about the doctor-patient relationship, that a patient's case does not merely
pose a technical problem, that a patient is an embodied consciousness, and that a patient is a participant in establishing the intelligibility of their own case, then the medical ethical concern regarding the optimization assumption
is clear for the prospects of AI and organizational design. For AI, we must remember that means and ends really do
matter; that AI (autonomous or not) is of limited value without “artificial intelligibility.” An information processing
system achieves artificial intelligibility when it is capable of situational rationality and its requisite participation in
practical ritualistic activity. This means that its task performance in the problem-solving process easily handles both
natural and socio-cognitive artifacts by sorting through what demands iterative recursion and what demands a highly
selective momentary belief about non-recursive ambiguity and its rhetorical effects.
As things stand, without the artificial intelligibility of the case, AI will effectuate diagnostic errors for at least
three reasons. First, the real world is not the ideal world in which the best adaptation for a moment is not an ideal
adaptation in the long run. Second, without accounting for the priority of discourse, a system cannot account for
how communication becomes formalized to match the input, leading to a troubling “computer knows best” attitude
(McDougall, 2019). Third, without accounting for the fact that human problem-solving is itself unable to optimize
(that medical diagnosis necessarily involves different degrees of uncertainty), unremarkable designs of output are likely
to add more uncertainty than clarity to the problem-solving process (Doraiswamy et al., 2020). Accordingly, artificial
intelligibility acknowledges the interference of the constitution of bounded rationality with the ideal optimization of
human problem-solving.
For organizational design, this cognitive sociological context reveals that the demands of adequate diagnostic
problem-solving are not being met (Heritage & Maynard, 2006; Kuper et al., 2017; Topol, 2019a). Task performance
continues to treat the patient's case as a technical problem in which the delivery of care and the acquisition of
informed consent are often formulaic means designed to maximize organizational resources across all possible cases
(Grote & Berens, 2020). In other words, the ethical issue surrounding technological innovation is that it provisions
general solutions to particular problems: for health and medicine, this problem is generally understood to be a source of
diagnostic error. The literature reviewed in this paper makes it clear that designing technology itself can only improve
(and optimize) our procedural and probabilistic rationality. The ethical consequence is that we are easily distracted
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from addressing sources of error in situational rationality, most notably, the more difficult challenge of being relentless in facing our own limitations and inadequacies. In the course of patient-centered diagnosis and care, these inadequacies are a minefield, one we must trek by engaging in a temporally open-ended conversation about the risks to
patients' lives and the character of their existence.
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END NOTE S
1

It is important for readers to understand that this is a description of adaptation according to a principle of least effort,
and not a principle of most effort, such as the complexities involved in scientific practices (e.g., Mol & Law, 2004; Moser
et al., 2006). A principle of least effort tends to result in dichotomous polarizations whereas a principle of most effort seeks
to balance the need for simplification with the need for complication.

2

The conception of discourse as “collective enunciation” is too complex to further elaborate here beyond highlighting its
thoroughly social character: “In other words, the momentousness and value of an ostensibly distinct gesture or utterance
depends on its participation as a moment of a course of activity and as an instance of collective enunciation or, more
broadly, of sociality as the basic fact.” (Brown, 2014, p. 434)

3

“Practical ritualistic activity” refers to the doing that balances the “substance” and “ceremony” of phasing inferential functions. In this respect, “substance” describes the aspect of activity that indicates participation in its doing has a primary
importance in its own right that is independent of the situation. “Ceremony” describes the aspect of activity that indicates
participation in its doing—in its own right—has a secondary importance; its primary importance indicates that participation
in its doing meets the participatory demands of the situation (Goffman, 1967). These aspects are important because they
highlight how the size and scope of what participants can visualize in memory has a significant bearing on the sense of what
is going on, as in the playing of a game of chess or within the course of learning in a classroom. The predicament of the
chess player (where the point of focus can vary from problem representations present on the chessboard to the audience)
and the predicament of the student (where the point of focus often ranges from books to presentation materials and other
designed mazes to the audience) describe how there is still the matter of balancing the “substance” and “ceremony” of what
is going on, as in the way Goffman describes interaction rituals. The medical encounter involves the same kind of predicament with far greater consequences: a conversation between a doctor and a patient—each of which have an asymmetrical
relationship in their problem-solving capacity to participate in addressing the patient's case (Cf. Foucault, 1973).

4

Situational rationality, from the perspective of cognitive sociology, seeks to understand how the transcendental aspect of
situations affects the course of the problem-solving process—where ambiguity is non-reducible as a function of the ongoing
course of activity, that is, “the essential sociality of humans” (Brown, 2014, p. 176). This perspective shares similarities with
the interests of science and technology scholars, but there are subtle differences in the meanings and evaluations made
of the constitution of performance, materiality, reflexivity, and creativity. For example, Marres et al. (2018, pp. 31–34)
argue situational rationality is “a project to recover the specificity of social forms in the face of ANT's indifference.” For
cognitive sociology, situational rationality is not a project; rather, it is an illumination of the communicative aspects that are
irreducibly social—aspects that are not merely a matter of social research describing the particularities of practices in need
of change.
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